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Australia’s growth performance since the early 1990s has been excep-
tional. Over the last ten years, annual gross domestic product (GDP)
growth averaged just under 4 percent—a performance not seen since the
1960s and early 1970s. Strong growth even persisted in the midst of the
1997 Asian ﬁnancial crisis and the 2001 global downturn.
A surge in productivity growth has underpinned Australia’s good perfor-
mance. After showing its weakest rate in the 1980s, Australia’s productiv-
ity growth accelerated by a little over 1 percentage point to new highs in the
1990s—labor productivity growth at an average 3.2 percent a year andmulti-
factor productivity (MFP) growth at 1.8 percent a year.
The much-improved performance has stimulated a search for reasons. A
few commentators have disputed the signiﬁcance of the evidence of a pro-
ductivity surge by speculating about the inﬂuence of recovery from the
early 1990s recession and measurement error.1 But the length and strength
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1. To account for an acceleration in productivity growth any measurement error would
have to have worsened (if an overestimation) or diminished (if an underestimation). The lat-
ter is more possible in that estimation of productivity in some service industries may have im-
proved. On the other hand, many OECD countries have similarly improved and harmonized
aspects of estimation, without generating estimates of productivity acceleration anywhere
near the strength of Australia’s.of the productivity resurgence—controlling for cyclical inﬂuences—de-
mand some “structural” explanations. Most attention has focused on three
candidates:
• a shift in the production frontier due to the introduction of new tech-
nology—speciﬁcally information and communications technologies
(ICTs);
• a shift toward the frontier through eﬃciency improvements stimulated
by a set of microeconomic policy reforms—“catch-up” gains from
ﬁrms moving toward best practice and from resources shifting to
where they can be used more productively;
• an increase in average education attainment and skills that would in-
crease human capital deepening and promote productivity through
the absorption and development of technologies and eﬃcient business
practices.
This paper concentrates on the ﬁrst possible explanation, particularly
since there has been worldwide interest in ICTs as a source of productivity
growth. A comparison with U.S. experience, using a growth accounting
framework, provides the basis for assessing the contribution of ICTs to
Australia’s aggregate productivity acceleration. Productivity growth and
the ICT contributions to it are sensitive to cyclical eﬀects. This study is dis-
tinguished from others by the attention paid to selection of periods that
minimize cyclical eﬀects. The paper also draws on other empirical work to
brieﬂy assess other possible explanations.
2.2 An Overview of Australia’s Productivity Performance
Australia’s recent productivity performance needs to be set in a broad
historical and international context to highlight some of the develop-
ments that should be covered in a comprehensive explanation of the 1990s
surge.
2.2.1 A Broad Sweep across Countries and the Decades
Australia’s rate of productivity growth was comparatively low over most
of the twentieth century. At the beginning of the century, Australia had one
of the highest levels of labor productivity in the world (Maddison 2001),
reﬂecting a relative abundance of natural resources per hour worked. Gov-
ernments subsequently traded this high productivity position for nation
building as, with widespread popular support, they encouraged popula-
tion growth, diversiﬁcation of the economic base, and redistribution of in-
come through a set of policies that (perhaps unintentionally) held growth
in productivity in check.
Nevertheless, Australia still enjoyed a relatively high ranking at the start
of the postwar era. In 1950, Australia’s GDP per hour was 81 percent of
42 Dean Parhamthe productivity leader—the United States—and it ranked fourth among
a group of twenty-two developed or high-income countries (ﬁgure 2.12and
table 2.1).
The next four decades were a period of catch-up to the leader and con-
vergence in productivity levels. European countries, in particular, started
to catch up and in some cases overtook the United States (ﬁgure 2.1).
Australia did not participate in this “convergence club.” Many countries
also overtook Australia as it slipped further behind the United States in the
1950s and then merely maintained its position relative to the United States
until 1990. Australia’s ranking slipped to sixteen by 1990.
A string of policy reviews in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s attributed this
relatively poor performance to highly regulated product, capital, and labor
markets and the ineﬃcient provision of economic infrastructure (energy,
water, transport, communications), which was dominated by government-
owned enterprises operating without clear commercial imperative or per-
formance regulation.
As a consequence of relatively poor productivity growth, Australia’s
ranking on the international league table of GDP per capita also dropped—
from ﬁve in 1950 to sixteen in 1990 (table 2.1).
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2. Figure 2.1 shows productivity levels in twenty-two OECD countries in 1950, 1960, 1973,
1990, and 2001. Some observations are oﬀset from the reference year on the chart to avoid
overwriting.
Fig. 2.1 Labor productivity in OECD countries, 1950, 1960, 1973, 1990, and
2001: GDP per hour (US$ at purchasing power parity)
Source:Data from University of Groningen and The Conference Board, GGDC Total Econ-
omy Database, 2003; http://www.eco.rug.nl/ggdc, accessed 25 July 2003.44 Dean Parham
Fig. 2.2 Growth in labor productivity over productivity cycles and contributions
from capital deepening and multifactor productivity, 1964–65 to 2001–02: average
annual rates of growth (percent)
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) 5204.0 and Productivity Commission esti-
mates.
Note:Productivity cycles are the intervals between productivity peaks, as identiﬁed by the ABS.
aIncomplete cycle.
Table 2.1 Australia’s Rankings on Productivity, Average Income, and Labor
Utilization Levels among Twenty-Two OECD Countries
1950 1960 1973 1990 2002
GDP per hour
Australia’s rank 4 5 12 16 16
% of U.S. level 81 75 73 76 83
GDP per capita
Australia’s rank 5 8 10 16 8
% of U.S. level 78 78 76 73 78
Labor utilization
Australia’s rank 15 16 6 6 7
% of U.S. level 96 104 104 96 96
Source: See ﬁgure 2.1.
Note: Labor utilization is the number of hours worked per head of total population. It ex-
plains the diﬀerence between GDP per hour and GDP per capita.
2.2.2 The Productivity Surge in the 1990s
Figure 2.2 shows the rates of labor productivity growth over produc-
tivity cycles in the market sector of the Australian economy. Measure-
ment over productivity cycles—from productivity peak to productivity
peak—neutralizes the spurious inﬂuence of the business cycle. The latest
period, 1998–99 to 2001–02, is not a complete cycle. Since productivity
growth over this period cannot be taken conﬁdently to be an underlyingrate, attention is focused on the most recent completed cycle, 1993–94 to
1998–99.
The ﬁgure shows that Australia’s productivity growth rebounded in the
1990s, with underlying rates reaching record highs. The record 3.2 percent
annual average labor productivity growth in the 1993–94 to 1998–99 cycle
compares with an average of 2.0 percent in the previous cycle and 1.7 per-
cent over the cycles from 1981–82 to 1993–94.
MFP growth was the major contributor to improved labor productivity
growth. With the rate of capital deepening stable at around 1.4 percent
ay ear,  better MFP growth has accounted for all of the acceleration in
Australia’s underlying labor productivity growth (ﬁg. 2.2). Record MFP
growth of 1.8 percent a year accounted for around two-thirds of labor pro-
ductivity growth in the 1990s cycle. MFP accelerated from 0.7 percent a
year—the average over both the previous cycle and the three cycles between
1981–82 and 1993–94.
The start of the surge cannot be pinpointed with precision because of
recession-related eﬀects. Figure 2.3 suggests that the Australian econ-
omy took a new growth path, based on higher MFP growth, in the early
1990s, by 1993.3 Even without precision, it would appear that Australia’s
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Fig. 2.3 Australia’s growth path, 1964–65 to 2001–02 (indexes 2001–01   100)
Source: ABS 5204.0.
Note: The years in brackets correspond to troughs in the business cycle.
3. Figure 2.3 plots paired observations of the capital-labor ratio and labor productivity lev-
els. Because of the general tendency of capital deepening, the observations line up in chrono-
logical order. Shifts from one observation to another can be attributed to combinations of
capital deepening and MFP growth. If the relative importance of MFP growth increases, as
happened in the 1990s, the observations follow a steeper gradient. See Parham (1999) for
more details on growth path analysis.productivity surge predated the uplift in U.S. productivity growth from
1995.
Strong productivity growth in the 1990s fuelled relatively strong growth
in average incomes and raised Australia’s GDP per capita ranking to 8
by 2002 (table 2.1). Australia’s level of GDP per head had recovered from
73 percent of the U.S. level in 1990 to regain its very long-term position at
around 78 percent by 2001.
In summary, Australia’s productivity and average income growth were
relatively poor when there was a worldwide productivity boom in the catch-
up and convergence era of the postwar period. Australia only started to
catch up on the United States during the 1990s—a period of mixed per-
formance across countries. U.S. productivity accelerated, contributing to a
breakdown in convergence across OECD countries.4 Australia not only
kept pace with, but exceeded, the U.S. acceleration to record one of the
highest accelerations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) area (OECD 2001a).
The 1990s brought an important change in the industry sources of ag-
gregate productivity growth. Figure 2.4 presents MFP growth rates in in-
dustry sectors over the past two aggregate productivity cycles. Some cau-
46 Dean Parham
4. Catch-up and convergence stalled in the 1990s as U.S. productivity accelerated relative
to most other countries (Australia being one notable exception). Convergence actually broke
down in the second half of the 1990s, when the U.S. productivity acceleration was strongest
(OECD 2001a; McGuckin and van Ark 2002).
Fig. 2.4 MFP growth in selected industries over the last two aggregate productiv-
ity cycles: average annual rates of growth (percent)
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data.tion about the precision of industry estimates is appropriate, particularly
in view of the value added method of estimation, which has been used in
the absence of data to support a KLEMS approach.5
In the 1988–89 to 1993–94 cycle, there was relatively strong productiv-
ity growth in the “traditional” contributors to aggregate productivity
growth—agriculture, mining, and manufacturing (left-hand side of ﬁg.2.4).
Two other strong performers—communication services and electricity, gas,
and water—joined these traditional sectors in this cycle. Their improved
performance stemmed from the major eﬃciencies (e.g., better investment
decisions and reductions in excess manning) achieved in government enter-
prises, as well as technological advances in some activities.
While productivity growth remained relatively strong in most of these in-
dustries in the 1990s cycle (mining and manufacturing being exceptions),
all these industries experienced a deceleration compared with the previous
cycle. On these estimates, none made a contribution to the productivity
surge from 1993–94.
A new set of service industries emerged in the 1990s. The standout per-
former was wholesale trade. Other service industries—for example, con-
struction and ﬁnance and insurance—also increased their rate of produc-
tivity growth signiﬁcantly. Because of their relative size, wholesale trade,
construction, and ﬁnance and insurance made the most substantial contri-
butions to the aggregate acceleration (table 2.2).
2.2.3 Key Features of the Productivity Surge
This sketch of Australia’s productivity performance has highlighted the
following key developments that need to be explained:
• From an international perspective, Australia’s productivity growth
switched from being relatively slow over at least four decades to be-
come relatively fast in the 1990s.
• The acceleration in labor productivity growth came through improved
eﬃciency (MFP growth) rather than increased capital deepening.
• The 1990s surge in MFP growth originated in a new set of service in-
dustries, in particular wholesale trade, construction, and ﬁnance and
insurance.
The absence of a worldwide productivity boom, the relative strength of
Australia’s productivity acceleration, and its starting point in the early
1990s suggest that some speciﬁcally Australian factors must form at least
an important part of the explanation.
The contribution of ICTs is now assessed. There was an ICT boom in the
1990s in a number of countries, including Australia.
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5. The diﬀerences in value added and KLEMS approaches are discussed by, for example,
Gullickson and Harper (1999).2.3 The Role of ICTs in Australia’s Productivity Surge
Many consider ICTs to be the major productivity-enhancing technolog-
ical advance of the 1990s. Advances in ICTs have brought widespread and,
in some cases, quite fundamental changes to businesses and households.
ICTs have been linked to labor productivity growth through three avenues.
Increases in capital deepening. Labor productivity can rise as a result of
higher capital use per unit of labor, as ﬁrms invest in more ICTs (where
measurement of ICT volumes takes into account increases in quality).
Many analysts have noted this mechanism aﬀords ICTs no special quali-
ties. As they have become cheaper, ﬁrms have substituted ICTs for labor
and other forms of capital—as could happen for many other inputs.
Productivity gains in ICT production. Producers’ ability to manufacture
much more powerful ICT equipment, with relatively little increase in in-
puts, generates substantial MFP gains. If the gains are of suﬃcient magni-
tude and production is on suﬃcient scale, they can show up as contribu-
tions to aggregate MFP growth.
Productivity gains in ICT-using industries. This is the more controversial
source of ICT-related productivity gains. It requires that use of ICTs
generate MFP gains. On the one hand, “new economy” enthusiasts have
pointed to MFP gains from such sources as increasing returns from ICT
use and spillovers from network economies. On the other hand, skeptics
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Table 2.2 Industry Contributions to the Acceleration in Market-Sector Multifactor
Productivity (MFP)
MFP Acceleration Output Contribution
(% per annum) Share (%) (percentage points)
Agriculture 0.0 6 0.0
Mining –2.2 8 –0.3
Manufacturing –1.5 22 –0.5
Electricity, gas, and water –2.2 5 –0.2
Construction 2.7 9 0.4
Wholesale trade 8.0 9 1.1
Retail trade 0.7 9 0.1
Accommodation, cafes, and 
restaurants 2.8 3 0.1
Transport and storage 1.0 9 0.1
Communications –1.0 5 –0.1
Finance and insurance 1.7 11 0.3
Cultural and recreational 
services –1.7 3 –0.1
Market sector 1.1 100 1.1
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on ABS data.
Notes: MFP acceleration is the change in growth from the period 1988–89 to 1993–94 to the
period 1993–94 to 1998–99. Output shares are calculated from estimates of current price
value added for 1993–94.have either denied or found little evidence to support the existence of MFP
gains from use.
Australia cannot access productivity gains from ICT production. The
ICT equipment production sector is not of suﬃcient size to generate pro-
ductivity gains of national signiﬁcance.
However, Australia has become a high ICT user. In 2000, Australia
ranked third (behind the United States and Finland) among OECD coun-
tries on expenditure on ICTs as a proportion of non-residential invest-
ment—a marked step up from its 1980 ranking (OECD 2002). Investment
in ICTs became a sizable proportion of total investment in Australia from
the mid-1980s. Since then, the growth of investment has been very strong,
especially in the second half of the 1990s, when investment in hardware
grew by 35 percent a year and software investment by 20 percent a year in
real terms.
As an importer of ICTs, Australia has beneﬁted from a sizable terms-of-
trade gain through the rapidly declining prices of ICTs. Strong interna-
tional competition has meant that MFP gains in production have been
passed on to purchasers. The Australian Treasury (Treasury 2002) stated
that ICT prices have fallen in domestic currency terms by 9.5 percent a
year and raised the terms of trade by 0.3 percent a year between 1985 and
2001. Since 1995, ICT prices have fallen by nearly 15 percent a year and
raised the terms of trade by 0.75 percent a year.
2.3.1 Aggregate Growth Accounting6
A conventional productivity growth accounting exercise is now used to
assess the inﬂuence of ICTs on Australia’s productivity performance. A
comparison with the United States is used to infer the likely contribution
of ICTs to Australia’s aggregate productivity growth.
The estimates of Australian labor productivity growth and the growth
accounting contribution to it are based on national accounts data con-
structed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). In keeping with
modern practice, the ABS uses hedonic (or constant-quality) price deﬂa-
tors to estimate real volumes of ICTs produced and purchased. Hedonic
prices have not been speciﬁcally generated for Australia. The ABS uses the
U.S. price deﬂator for hardware, adjusted for exchange rate movements and
a time lag, and a price deﬂator for software that shows a nominal 6 percent
a year decline. The U.S. and Australian deﬂators are shown in ﬁgure 2.5.
There has been a string of U.S. studies of ICT contributions to produc-
tivity growth. For brevity, however, this paper focuses on comparisons with
the United States, based on Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data. Using
BLS data brings two advantages:
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6. The growth accounting presented in this section is updated from Parham, Roberts, and
Sun (2001).• The ABS models its methods closely on BLS methods, and this en-
hances comparability.7
• Access to the BLS data set assists ﬂexibility in choosing periods for
comparison.
A capital services measure of capital input is used and labor input is
measured by hours worked. U.S. studies also include a labor composition
or “quality” component, but this component cannot be estimated on a
comparable basis or for the entire period for Australia. Consequently, this
component is added back into the U.S. MFP growth estimates presented
hereafter to assist comparability with Australian estimates.8
There was a big step up in contributions from ICT capital deepening from
1995 in the United States and Australia (ﬁg. 2.6). The timing and strength of
the ICT capital-deepening contributions in the two countries are remark-
ably close. This suggests that there have been similar rates of increase in ICT
use in the two countries and supports the validity of using the United States
as a comparator for the assessment of the impacts of ICT use in Australia.
Our work at the Productivity Commission has paid particular atten-
tion to selection of periods that identify underlying rates of productivity
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Fig. 2.5 ICT hardware and software price indexes, United States and Australia
(index 1995–96   100)
Source: Unpublished ABS data and Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data.
7. Nevertheless, there are a few diﬀerences of note. Australian data cover information tech-
nology (IT), without communications equipment, whereas U.S. data cover ICTs. The U.S. es-
timates used here cover the private business sector, whereas Australian estimates cover the
market sector. The main diﬀerence between the two is that the ABS-deﬁned market sector ex-
cludes property and business services.
8. This does, of course, assist comparability, but in a conceptually inferior way. It would be
preferable to factor out labor composition eﬀects in Australia in order to draw comparisons
with the United States. The practical signiﬁcance of this issue rests on whether compositional
eﬀects would have been greatly diﬀerent in the two countries. Unpublished ABS work (see
section 2.4.1) suggests that compositional eﬀects in Australia over the 1980s and 1990s would
not be greatly dissimilar to those in the United States.growth. Focus on underlying trends, rather than pre- and post-1995 rates
of growth, presents a departure from nearly all other previous Australian
and U.S. studies.
It is not surprising that most studies have used 1995 as the dividing year
between periods for comparison of productivity growth and ICT contri-
butions to it—for example, accounting for productivity growth in the sec-
ond half of the 1990s (1995–99) compared with the ﬁrst half (1990–95).9
The 1995 year corresponds to the takeoﬀ point in more rapid advances in
ICT technology, declines in ICT prices, growth in investment in ICTs, and,
as just seen, growth in ICT capital deepening. Using 1995 as a break point
between periods therefore highlights the ICT takeoﬀ and its eﬀects.
But using 1995 as the break point creates problems in identifying and
accounting for underlying rates of productivity growth. U.S. labor pro-
ductivity was in a trough in 1995, at a point below trend (ﬁg. 2.7).10 Esti-
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Fig. 2.6 Contributions of ICT capital deepening to labor productivity growth in
the United States and Australia, 1961 to 2002 (percentage points)
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data (to 2001–02)
and BLS data (to 2001).
Note: For Australia, years refer to twelve months ending 30 June.
9. Major examples of studies using pre- and post-1995 periods are Oliner and Sichel (2000),
Gordon (2000), Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000), and CEA (2001). Gordon, however, does make
a cyclical adjustment. Simon and Wardrop (2001) is an Australian example.
10. A Hodrick-Prescott ﬁlter is used to form the trend series presented in ﬁgure 2.7. This
does not clearly identify the Australian peaks as being above trend. However, the ABS uses
an eleven-period Henderson moving average to identify a trend series and (the same) pro-
ductivity peaks in oﬃcial productivity estimates.52 Dean Parham
Fig. 2.7 Identifying peaks in U.S. and Australian labor productivity (index 1996
  100)
Source: Unpublished ABS data (to 2001–02) and BLS data (to 2001).
Note: For Australia, years refer to twelve months ending 30 June.
mates of average growth from 1995 to the end of the 1990s are from a
trough to a peak and therefore overstate the underlying rate of labor pro-
ductivity growth. Moreover, the size of the estimated labor productivity ac-
celeration is quite sensitive to minor variations in period selection around
1995 (Parham, Roberts, and Sun 2001).
Issues with the break point and sensitivity can be set aside by analyzing
contributions to trendrates of productivity growth. The ABS method of es-
timating productivity growth over productivity cycles—from productivity
peak to productivity peak—is one way of measuring underlying rates of
growth. Adopting this method puts the prime focus on accelerations in
underlying rates of productivity growth.
The contributions to labor productivity growth over productivity cycles
are shown for the United States in ﬁgure 2.8and for Australia in ﬁgure 2.9.
The 1990s cycle for the United States is from 1992 to 2000 and for Australia
from 1993–94 to 1998–99. Contributions to the labor productivity acceler-
ations in the 1990s cycle (compared with the previous cycle) in both coun-
tries are presented in table 2.3. Contributions to the labor productivity ac-
celerations from the ﬁrst to the second half of the 1990s are shown for
purely comparative purposes in table 2.4. The estimated labor productivity
acceleration is lower according to the productivity cycle method, com-
pared with the pre- and post-1995 method. In particular, the U.S. acceler-
ation is still signiﬁcant but a much less spectacular 0.5 of a percentage
point (table 2.3), compared with 1.1 percentage points (table 2.4).
There are several important similarities in the U.S. and Australian re-
sults:
• The ICTs have made strong capital-deepening contributions. The ICT
capital-deepening contribution has increased steadily from the 1960sin both countries (ﬁgs. 2.8 and 2.9). ICT capital deepening accounted
for around a third of labor productivity growth in both countries in
their respective 1990s cycles. ICT capital deepening made the same
contribution (0.3 of a percentage point) to the 1990s labor productiv-
ity accelerations in both countries (table 2.3).11
• However, there has been little or no increase in the overall rate of cap-
ital deepening in either country, especially in Australia (table 2.3).
Much or all of the increased use of ICTs (per hour worked) in the
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11. The slightly lower contribution in the United States was due to stronger labor input
growth rather than weaker ICT capital growth.
Fig. 2.8 Contributions to U.S. labor productivity growth over productivity cycles,
1960 to 2000 (percent per year)
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on BLS data.
Note: MFP growth includes the labor composition (quality) contribution.
Fig. 2.9 Contributions to Australian labor productivity growth over productivity
cycles, 1964–65 to 1998–99 (percent per year)
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data.1990s has been oﬀset by slower growth in use of other forms of capital
(per hour worked). This result contrasts with that found in most other
studies of the United States (exempliﬁed by the results in table 2.4),
which have found that ICTs have contributed to a marked increase in
the rate of substitution of capital for labor.
• Growth in MFP accounted for over half the labor productivity growth
in the 1990s cycle in both countries. Faster MFP growth accounts for
most of the 1990s labor productivity accelerationsin both countries—
entirely so in Australia’s case.
The main diﬀerence between the U.S. and Australian results lies in the
strength of the productivity accelerations. The acceleration in underlying
labor productivity growth in Australia, at 1.2 percentage points, is more
than twice that in the United States (table 2.2). With similar capital-
deepening contributions, the chief explanation for the diﬀerence lies in the
much stronger MFP acceleration in Australia (1.1 percentage points) than
in the United States (0.3 of a percentage point).
The stronger productivity acceleration in Australia suggests that the
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Table 2.3 Contributions to Labor Productivity Accelerations in the 1990s
Productivity Cycle in the United States and Australia (percentage points)
United States Australia
Labor productivity acceleration 0.5 1.2
Capital deepening 0.2 0.0




Other capital –0.2 –0.3
MFP contribution 0.3 1.1
Notes: United States column shows growth in 1992 to 2000 less growth in 1986 to 1992. Aus-
tralia column shows growth in 1993–94 to 1998–99 less growth in 1988–89 to 1993–94.
Table 2.4 Contributions to Productivity Accelerations from 1990–95 to 1995–2000
in the United States and Australia (percentage points)
United States Australia
Labor productivity acceleration 1.1 1.1
Capital-deepening contribution 0.6 0.4
ICT 0.5 0.5
Other 0.1 –0.1
MFP contribution 0.5 0.6
Note: For Australia, years refer to twelve months ending 30 June.Australian economy beneﬁted from one or both of two factors: bigger
gains from the use of ICTs and/or more gains from non-ICT factors. In
either case, it does not necessarily mean—and generally it is highly
unlikely—that productivity levels in Australia have moved ahead of U.S.
levels. Rather, as the background in section 2.2 suggests, it is likely that
Australia had more scope to improve from a lower base and has caught up
on at least some of the superior U.S. levels.
It seems reasonable to assume, consistent with the U.S. leadership in
productivity and ICTs, that the U.S. estimates establish the upper limit of
0.3 of a percentage point on the productivity acceleration that can be as-
sociated speciﬁcally with ICT production and use.12Studies such as that by
Oliner and Sichel (2000) have attributed around 0.3 of a percentage point
of aggregate MFP growth acceleration to ICT production, although the
acceleration was calculated pre- and post-1995 and may therefore over-
state the contribution to the acceleration in trend productivity growth.13
The acceleration over productivity cycles would be less—perhaps half or
one- or two-tenths of a percentage point.
Even if the more favorable view of the importance of ICTs is taken from
the comparison between the ﬁrst and second halves of the 1990s, table 2.3
suggests that the maximum acceleration due to production and use of ICTs
is 0.6 of a percentage point (the MFP acceleration in the United States).
Taking the contribution of ICT production to be around 0.3 of a percent-
age point, as calculated by Oliner and Sichel, means that the ICT use com-
ponent is a maximum of 0.3 of a percentage point.
The estimate of one- or two-tenths of a percentage point from ICT use
in the United States is devoid of any catch-up eﬀects, since the United
States is at the frontier. This estimate therefore indicates the extent of spill-
over productivity gains associated with ICT use. In Australia, they would
be in addition to any catch-up eﬀects.
The estimated magnitude ﬁts well with other econometrically based ev-
idence. Bean (2000) used a cross-country regression as a basis to calculate
that Australia’s rate of ICT uptake would have contributed 0.12 percent-
age points to annual productivity growth. Gretton, Gali, and Parham
(2002) constructed an aggregate contribution of 0.14 percentage points
from the formal analysis of ﬁrm-level data.
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12. This implicitly assumes that no other contributors to productivity growth, such as tech-
nological change unrelated to ICTs, have accelerated in the United States. Using the United
States as a benchmark for Australia also implicitly assumes that there are no important diﬀer-
ences in industry composition between the two economies.
13. There has been some overstatement of the productivity acceleration apportioned to
ICT production. Productivity improvements have been calculated by the dual method of
measuring price declines and attributing them entirely to productivity improvements. How-
ever, some of the price declines have been due to declining proﬁt margins (see, for example,
Aizcorbe 2002).2.3.2 An Industry Perspective
While the evidence to date suggests that MFP gains associated with ICTs
at the aggregate level are signiﬁcant but not spectacular, there is evidence
of stronger links in some industries. In some countries, including the
United States, Japan, Korea, Finland, and Ireland, there are opportunities
for very substantial productivity gains in the manufacture of ICTs.
There also appear to be stronger links associated with the use of ICTs in
certain industries. Several studies of the United States have found evidence
of productivity acceleration in the 1990s in wholesale trade; retail trade; ﬁ-
nance, insurance, and real estate (especially in ﬁnancial intermediation);
and business services. These have also been characterized as intensive users
of ICTs (Stiroh 2001; Nordhaus 2001; Centre for the Study of Living Stan-
dards [CSLS] 2000; Council of Economic Advisors [CEA] 2001; Pilat and
Lee 2001).
As noted in section 2.2, a similar set of industries emerged in the 1990s
as major contributors to Australia’s productivity surge. The pattern of in-
creased ICT usage and MFP acceleration across Australian industries is
displayed in ﬁgure 2.10.14 Finance and insurance, wholesale trade, retail
trade, and construction had above-average increases in ICT use and had
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Fig. 2.10 Change in industry ICT use and productivity growth in Australian indus-
tries over the 1990s (percentage points)
Source: Productivity Commission estimates based on unpublished ABS data.
Note:The productivity acceleration is calculated as the change in trendMFP growth between
ﬁnancial years 1990–95 and 1995–2000.
14. The use of trend rates of productivity growth and diﬀerent periods explains the diﬀer-
ences in industry productivity accelerations show in ﬁgures 2.4 and 2.10.above-average MFP accelerations. Unfortunately, the equivalent industry
data are not available from BLS sources to replicate this chart for the
United States.
The coincidence of industries with increases in ICT use and productiv-
ity accelerations in the United States and Australia provides some circum-
stantial evidence for a link between ICT use and productivity growth at an
industry level—concentrated in distribution, ﬁnancial intermediation,
and business services (although Australian productivity data on the last in-
dustry are not available). There may also be ICT-productivity links at the
ﬁrm level in other industries that, because of interﬁrm diﬀerences in these
and other factors, do not translate as readily into industry or aggregate
trends (see Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000). But ﬁgure 2.10 also suggests that
the productivity accelerations in some Australian industries were unrelated
to ICT use (and equally that increases in ICT use in some industries were
not associated with MFP accelerations).
The relationship between ICT use and productivity growth is complex
rather than immediate and direct. ICTs are often viewed as general-
purpose technologies that require time to bring to their full potential and
enable productivity gains by providing a platform for other innovations in
products and processes (see, for example, Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000 and
Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002).
The Australian evidence supports the view that it is changes in products
and processes, enabled at least in part by ICTs, that generate productivity
gains.15 The ﬁnance and insurance industry has been restructured to oper-
ate much more through ICTs (for example, ATM, Internet, and phone
banking) than through traditional face-to-face contacts, leading to a re-
structuring of branch operations. Many new products (for example, ﬁnan-
cial derivatives) are now on oﬀer.
An earlier study by Productivity Commission staﬀ(Johnston et al. 2000)
also found that ICTs played a part in the restructuring of wholesaling ac-
tivities. Wholesalers were able to use bar-code and scanning technology
and inventory management systems as part of the process of transforming
wholesaling from a storage-based to a fast ﬂow-through operation.
The complexity of the relationships between ICT use and productivity
performance reinforces the importance of taking an industry or ﬁrm point
of view. Productivity gains depend on the diﬀerent actions that diﬀerent
ﬁrms take. A ﬁrm focus helps to identify the importance of lags between
uptake of ICTs and productivity gain and the signiﬁcance of complemen-
tary innovations in products and processes. The signiﬁcance of ICTs and
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15. If the ICT hedonic price deﬂators are measured correctly, advances in ICTs are mea-
sured as embodied improvements. The MFP gains associated with ICT use, for example
through ﬁrm reorganization, can then be considered as disembodied improvements that are
nevertheless captured by the users. In some cases, lower transactions costs in business ex-
changes could be a spillover beneﬁt of expanding ICT networks.complementarities has been conﬁrmed in Productivity Commission work
for an international project, coordinated by the OECD, to explore the links
between ICT use and performance at the ﬁrm level (Gretton, Gali, and
Parham 2002). Productivity-enhancing complementarities between ICTs,
skills, and business restructuring were found in an analysis of an Aus-
tralian longitudinal micro data set.
The main conclusion from the aforementioned growth accounting is
that the rapid uptake of ICTs has had important but comparatively small
inﬂuence on aggregate productivity growth in Australia. It appears to ac-
count for, at most, one- or two-tenths of a percentage point of Australia’s
1.1 percentage point MFP acceleration. On the other hand, ICTs have had
more marked productivity eﬀects in individual ﬁrms and industries. It
would appear that ICTs provide at least partial explanation for the accel-
eration in the new set of service industries—particularly ﬁnance and in-
surance, construction, and wholesale trade.
However, the mere availability of new ICT technologies does not explain
why Australian businesses adopted them with such vigor from the mid-
1980s and put them to such productive use in the 1990s. After all, Australia’s
prior history was generally one of relatively slow adoption of advanced
technologies. And although new ICTs have been available worldwide, many
other advanced countries have not been as quick or productive on the up-
take. A probable explanation for this conundrum is provided later.
2.4 Other Explanations
The conclusion that ICTs have only contributed a relatively small part of
the acceleration leaves the vast bulk of Australia’s improved performance
unexplained—an unsatisfactory point on which to ﬁnish this paper. This
section brieﬂy draws on other work to at least consider other possible ex-
planations.
2.4.1 Education and Skills
Steve Dowrick has reminded us of the importance of skills in the work-
force as a source of growth, both directly as an “embodied” labor input and
indirectly in fostering absorption and further development of technology
(see Dowrick 2002a,b and chap. 1 in this volume). He has highlighted the
increase in school retention rates and labor force participation of females
over the past ten to ﬁfteen years. Basing his conclusions on a review of the
empirical literature, Dowrick ﬁnds that raising Australia’s average years of
schooling by 0.8 could raise Australia’s annual rate of productivity growth
by a third of a percentage point through direct and indirect means.
Whereas Dowrick casts his analysis in a long-term framework (given the
time required for the ﬂow of educational attainments to aﬀect the average
across the stock of employment), it is nevertheless of considerable interest
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tivity surge. The information presented in Dowrick’s papers shows that
Australia (along with New Zealand) had the highest average schooling
across countries in 1960, but average attainment grew faster in comparator
countries over the next four decades, so that Australia slipped signiﬁcantly
in position by 2000. Nevertheless, the increase in average schooling in Aus-
tralia was higher in the 1990s than in the 1980s.
Productivity Commission colleagues Barnes and Kennard (2002) have
added more information. They examined preliminary ABS research that
takes account of changes in workforce composition in the construction of
a “quality-adjusted” labor input series. This series reﬂects changes in the
labor inputs of groups identiﬁed by gender, educational attainment, and
potential workforce experience. Taking into account workforce experi-
ence, the growth in skills was faster in the 1980s than in 1990s.
Barnes and Kennard’s work suggests that there has not been a human
capital accumulation eﬀect on 1990s MFP growth. The relative increase in
skills in the 1980s, accounted for the order of 0.3 of a percentage point of
average annual MFP growth. But the skill contribution decelerated to
around 0.05 of a percentage point from 1993–94. The direct contribution
of skills to the 1990s productivity acceleration is negativeon these numbers.
However, indirect eﬀects, where education and skills assist the develop-
ment and absorption of technology, could still be important. Links to the
absorption of ICTs is a particular case in point, and, as noted above, com-
plementarities between skills and ICT use have been empirically con-
ﬁrmed. On the other hand, there is a gap in the ability of education and skill
levels to explain the broad sweep of Australia’s productivity performance.
When Australia’s average years of schooling was above other countries
around the 1960s and early 1970s, the rate of productivity catch-up was rel-
atively poor. After a period of relatively slow growth in attainment and
when Australia’s average schooling had fallen below other countries, the
rate of productivity catch-up was relatively high. Without undermining the
general importance of education and skills, this suggests that other factors
were  acting as the main constraint on productivity growth in earlier
decades and as the main facilitators of productivity growth in the 1990s. It
is also diﬃcult to explain the industry sources of the productivity acceler-
ation in terms of education and skills—perhaps not so much in ﬁnancial
intermediation, but certainly in wholesale trade.
2.4.2 Policy Reforms
By the 1980s, Australia’s continued slippage on the international league
table of average income, combined with pessimism about the future, gal-
vanized community support for governments to take policy action to ad-
dress structural weaknesses in the Australian economy. Key objectives
were to raise growth in productivity and living standards.
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1980s, have included deregulation of access to ﬁnance, ﬂoating the cur-
rency, marked reductions in barriers to trade and foreign direct investment,
commercialization (and some privatization) of government business enter-
prises, strengthening domestic competition, and increasing labor market
ﬂexibility.
Policy reforms were designed to improve productivity performance by
• sharpening incentives to be more productive, chieﬂy by strengthening
competition from domestic and overseas sources;
• opening the economy to trade, investment, technologies, and know-
how developed overseas;
• providing greater ﬂexibility (for example, less regulatory restriction,
more ﬂexible labor markets) to adjust production processes and ﬁrm
organization to improve productivity.
It may be a matter of logic that, if previous policy frameworks were hold-
ing productivity growth in check, reform of those frameworks would allow
productivity to accelerate. But empirical evidence is needed to conﬁrm the
importance of reforms.
A number of analysts, calling on a range of empirical and other evi-
dence, have found that microeconomic policy reforms have played a ma-
jor role in Australia’s productivity surge (see, for example, Productivity
Commission [PC] 1999; Bean 2000; Dowrick 2000; Forsyth 2000; OECD
2001b). Macroeconomic policies have also been framed in ways that have
helped to maintain stability in output growth.
However, it is diﬃcult to put a particular order of magnitude on the in-
ﬂuence of policy reforms on productivity growth. Formal analysis is not
straightforward, particularly since it is diﬃcult to construct a measure of
policy reform at the aggregate level that accurately quantiﬁes the timing,
breadth, and intensity of reforms. By deﬁnition, reforms have operated at
the micro level through a mixture of industry measures (e.g., deregulation,
commercialization of government enterprises), sectoral measures (e.g.,
phased reductions in tariﬀs on manufactures) and general measures (e.g.,
deregulation of access to ﬁnance and the introduction of enterprise ﬂexi-
bility into workplace bargaining). Furthermore, it is diﬃcult to specify a
structure of lags between implementation of reforms (which was often
graduated) and production response.
Despite these diﬃculties, Salgado (2000) found a positive link between
structural reforms and aggregate productivity growth. On his estimates, re-
forms contributed between 0.5 and 0.9 of a percentage point at the aggre-
gate level. Empirical support is also found in detailed industry and ﬁrm
case studies (see, for example, PC 1999). For example, the links between
policy reforms and strong productivity responses in government business
enterprises (see section 2.2) can be ﬁrmly established. And there are evi-
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ductivity growth, such as openness to trade and investment, industry spe-
cialization (including intra-industry trade), uptake of advanced technol-
ogies, business R&D, and rates of innovation (PC 1999).
The inﬂuence of policy reforms can explain the developments in the Aus-
tralian economy outlined in section 2.2. It can explain improvements in
eﬃciency (MFP growth rather than capital deepening). Reforms were in-
tended to realize catch-up gains by forcing and enabling businesses to im-
prove technical eﬃciency (moving toward best practice), reduce or close
ineﬃcient operations, and adopt a more innovative, market-driven culture.
Delayed success in catch-up, facilitated by policy reforms, can explain Aus-
tralia’s transition from an international laggard to a front-runner in pro-
ductivity growth. It would also provide a “home-grown” or Australian-
speciﬁc explanation for the productivity success in the 1990s.
Reforms could also help to explain the emergence of rapid and innova-
tive use of ICTs in the 1990s. With stronger competitive incentive, busi-
nesses became more alert to the opportunities that new technologies
provide and, with greater ﬂexibility, became better able to put them to
productive use.
But can the introduction of policy reforms explain the industry sources
of the productivity acceleration? The incidence of reforms is clear in areas
such as electricity, gas and water, and parts of communications services
and transport and storage, following reforms to the operations of govern-
ment enterprises. Financial intermediation has also been subject to far-
reaching reforms over many years. But what about the standout performer,
wholesale trade?
Johnston et al. (2000) found that reforms were acting as underlying driv-
ers and facilitators of productivity gains in wholesaling. It was not so much
that wholesaling became much more ICT intensive or that new “break-
through” technologies became available. It was more that the competitive
incentives to be productive became stronger and that new ﬂexibilities be-
came open to businesses to use ICTs as part of a more general process of
restructuring and transformation. For example, the motor vehicle industry
was looking for eﬃciencies all along the “value chain,” including in distri-
bution, to meet the increased competition from cheaper imports entering
under lower border protection. Distribution has increasingly involved
streamlined delivery of imported products and more customized products
from local producers building fewer models at fewer production plants.
Another contributor in some areas of wholesaling was the reform of in-
dustrial relations processes that allowed greater labor ﬂexibility through
the introduction of split shifts and reduced the rigidity of job demarca-
tions.
A plausible explanation for the productivity gains in wholesaling is that,
under increased competitive pressure, businesses rationalized production
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systems to reconﬁgure their distribution processes. They greatly reduced
costs of storage and handling in the process. The large productivity gains
in wholesaling were passed on, with proﬁt margins declining in the 1990s
(Parham et al. 2000).
2.5 Conclusions
Australia’s labor productivity and MFP growth reached record highs in
the 1990s. An acceleration of over 1 percentage point shifted Australia
from being a laggard to being a front-runner on productivity growth
among OECD countries. Higher labor productivity growth in the 1990s
came from improved eﬃciency rather than capital deepening. A new set of
service industries, particularly wholesale trade, construction, and ﬁnance
and insurance, appears to be at the heart of the productivity acceleration.
Taking into account the historical and international trends, it seems
clear that the Australian economy has embarked on a process of catch-up,
much delayed in comparison with many other high-income countries. Aus-
tralia has not been favored in comparison to other countries by some new
technology, a change in the structure of industries, a leap forward in the
skills of the workforce, or any other obvious structural factor. It seems that
there has been a general improvement in eﬃciency of resource use that has
narrowed, but not eliminated, the productivity gap with many other ad-
vanced economies.16
This paper has concentrated on the role that ICTs may have played in
Australia’s productivity surge. Australia is a high user but low producer of
ICTs. As an importer of ICTs it has beneﬁted from terms-of-trade eﬀects
as ICT prices have declined. Australian businesses have also used ICTs in
“smart” ways—taking advantage of the product and process innovations
that ICTs enable. These have been a source of productivity gain for ﬁrms.
And ICTs have played a role in the service industries contributing to the ac-
celeration in aggregate productivity.
However, the overall contribution of ICTs to higher aggregate produc-
tivity growth in terms of frontier shifts has been relatively small. Compar-
ison with the United States suggests that use of ICTs could only account
for one- or two-tenths of a percentage point of the underlying productivity
acceleration. This result is lower than that found in previous U.S. and Aus-
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16. A remaining productivity gap at the aggregate level is evident in the data presented in
section 2.2. Research at the Groningen Growth and Development Centre on sectoral com-
parisons (van Ark and Timmer 2002) suggests that Australia has slipped further behind U.S.
labor productivity levels in two areas of strong U.S. growth—manufacturing (where Australia
remains at around 40 percent of U.S. levels) and wholesale and retail trade (around 50 percent
of U.S. levels). In transport and communications, however, Australia has moved further
ahead of the United States since 1980 and is now about 150 percent of the U.S. level.tralian studies, which have overstated the contribution of ICTs to produc-
tivity growth by failing to control for cyclical inﬂuences.
An increase in educational attainment and skills may also have con-
tributed in some small measure to Australia’s productivity surge. The tim-
ing of human capital accumulation—faster in the 1980s than the 1990s—
and the extent of the increase—slower in Australia than in other
countries—do not sit well with Australia’s historically and internationally
strong productivity surge in the 1990s. There would appear to be only a
weak link between skills and the industry sources of productivity growth—
particularly in wholesaling.
Nevertheless, education and skills could still have some indirect inﬂu-
ence through absorption of technology. The uptake and productive use of
ICTs is a particular case in point. (The productivity impacts of skills and
ICTs would therefore not be additive.)
There is theoretical and empirical support for policy reforms playing a
substantial role in Australia’s productivity surge through catch-up gains in
eﬃciency. Nevertheless, further empirical evidence would help to bolster
this conclusion. Policy reforms also provide plausible explanation for Aus-
tralia’s shift from laggard to front-runner and the industry sources of the
productivity acceleration.
Rather than being “alternative” explanations, reforms ICTs and skills
can be seen as complementary. In a more competitive, open, and ﬂexible
business environment, Australian businesses were forced and enabled to
restructure in order to catch up. They also became more alert to opportu-
nities that new technologies, such as ICTs, could provide, and either these
businesses incorporated them into their restructuring moves or new ﬁrms
emerged to take the new opportunities. That is, reforms played a part in
driving the uptake of ICTs and in enabling them to be used productively.
The right amount and mix of education and skills also assisted the use of
ICTs and the identiﬁcation and implementation of ways to take advantage
of what the new technologies could oﬀer.
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Comment Chin Hee Hahn
This paper addresses the question why the pace of productivity growth in
Australia accelerated in the 1990s. As possible explanations this paper con-
siders three factors: micro policy reforms in various areas since the mid-
1980s, upgrading of labor skills, and the increasing use of ICTs. I think this
is a very important question, especially in the following sense. In the
growth literature, there have been debates over whether the variations in
income levels or growth rates are driven by variations in total factor pro-
ductivity growth (TFPG) or by variations in the pace of input accumula-
tion. Theoretically, this debate has its root in the debates over whether the
neoclassical growth theory or the endogenous growth theory is the more
appropriate framework to explain the observed cross-country diﬀerences
in growth rates. One of the main claims from the neoclassical side came
from Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992), who show that, once the cross-
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Chin Hee Hahn is a research fellow at the Korea Development Institute.country diﬀerences in human capital are taken into account, the cross-
country income levels (or growth rates) are mostly explained by the diﬀer-
ences in input accumulation. However, there seems to be growing evidence
that it is the diﬀerences in TFPG, rather than the diﬀerences in the pace of
input accumulation, that drives the diverse growth outcome. Klenow and
Rodriguez-Clare (1998), Easterly et al. (1993), and Rodrik (1999) are ex-
amples along this line. One of the main implications from these studies
seems to be that in order to explain the variations (both cross-sectional and
over time within a country) in growth rates of output, we have to look at
policy or institutional factors that can explain the variations in TFPG. I
think this paper asks exactly this question: what the determinants are be-
hind Australia’s productivity surge in the 1990s.
I think this paper provides very interesting facts, relying on growth ac-
counting methodology, on the patterns of Australia’s productivity growth,
together with the role of ICT investments, which could be summarized as
follows. First, it is carefully documented that Australia experienced accel-
eration in the growth rate of labor and total factor productivity in the
1990s. Second, the acceleration in the labor productivity growth is pre-
dominantly accounted for by the acceleration in the pace of TFPG, not in
the pace of input accumulation. The pace of input accumulation has been
clearly stable over time. Third, the acceleration in TFPG in the 1990s has
been concentrated in several service-sector industries, such as wholesale
trade, transport and storage, and ﬁnance and insurance, which usually use
ICT intensively. Fourth, ICT capital deepening occurred while other con-
ventional capital accumulation slowed down, making the pace of total cap-
ital accumulation stable over the decades. I think these facts provided by
this paper provide the basis for any future research eﬀorts that aim to ex-
plain the patterns of Australian productivity growth in the 1990s. If we ac-
cept these facts, then I think any serious set of explanations for the pro-
ductivity surge in Australia in 1990s should be able to explain these facts
altogether. I think the author is rightly going this way.
Methodologically, the author uses standard tools in the literature and
pays special attention to the business-cycle eﬀects, so that the empirical
facts provided in this paper seems to be quite reliable.
Relying on the growth accounting, elimination of candidate explana-
tions, and comparison with the benchmark case of the United States, the
author claims that micro policy reforms in the 1980s account for most of
the productivity surge by about 1 percentage point (annual average) in the
1990s and that the ICT factor accounts for only a small part (at most 0.3 of
a percentage point). The paper further emphasizes the importance of ear-
lier policy reforms by claiming that increased market competition coming
from the reforms induced the economic agents to use ICTs more inten-
sively and eﬃciently.
Overall, the facts provided in this paper are interesting. However, al-
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force behind the productivity surge in the 1990s is quite reasonable, I think
the author’s way of supporting this argument seems to be vulnerable to
some criticisms, which I think substantially undermines the validity of his
argument.
First, there seems to be some discrepancies between the author’s initial
question and what the author actually does in his paper. The question he
raises is what the major factors are, among the three competing hypothe-
ses, behind the productivity surge. However, what the author does seems to
be, mainly, to answer how much of the acceleration in labor productivity
growth in the 1990s is accounted for by the ICT investments. If one uses the
growth accounting methodology alone, one cannot expect to distinguish
between the three competing hypotheses he suggested, especially between
the policy reform story and the ICT story. I think that’s why the author tries
to use the approach of “elimination” of a story that is relatively easily
quantiﬁable—in this case the ICT story. However, even if we believe his ar-
gument that the ICT (and labor skill) story explains at best a small fraction
of the acceleration in TFPG, that does not mean that all of the remaining
TFPG surge is attributable to earlier policy reforms. That is, there may be
other factors that have not been considered in the paper from the start.
Second, the paper would be more coherent if it were clear about whether
the labor productivity or total factor productivity should be focused along
the discussion. Since the author starts out his paper by providing facts on
TFPG, I think the following discussion should be the one that tries to ex-
plain the TFPG surge, not the labor productivity surge. The growth ac-
counting methodology he uses in his main analysis alone cannot be used to
explain the TFPG surge; it is merely a methodology that further decom-
poses input accumulation into conventional capital and ICT capital.
Third, since the author does not deal with spillovers from ICT use, it
seems to be premature to conclude that ICT is not a main factor in Aus-
tralia’s productivity surge. Rather, the fact that industries with rapid
pickup in TFPG in the 1990s were the industries using ICT intensively sug-
gests that the opposite might be true (although I still do not believe that this
is the very plausible story). Also, the author’s claim that the TFPG gain
from ICT in Australia cannot exceed the gain found in the United States is
not very convincing. The size of network externalities associated with ICT
use might be diﬀerent across countries.
So here are my suggestions. First, cross-industry variation in changes of
TFPG might be worthwhile to examine. The fact that industries that expe-
rienced a productivity surge in the 1990s were mostly nontradable service
industries seems to be worth paying attention to. This fact seems to imply
that it might be worthwhile to look at, for example, whether there have
been signiﬁcant changes in terms of trade, which aﬀected the domestic de-
mand component of GDP disproportionately. Second, since the wholesale
Australia’s 1990s Productivity Surge and Its Determinants 67trade industry is a large industry for most economies and it experienced the
most rapid acceleration in TFPG in the 1990s, it might be worthwhile to
narrow down on discussing why that industry’s TFPG accelerated. Third,
if it is practically diﬃcult to provide convincing evidence on the role of re-
forms in enhancing productivity, then it might be desirable to change the
organization of the paper by strengthening the description of the empiri-
cal facts and by discussing brieﬂy the possible reasons at the later part of
the paper.
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Comment Francis T. Lui
Dean Parham has tried to show in his paper that labor productivity has ex-
perienced a marked increase in Australia from the early 1990s to the late
1990s. Moreover, a signiﬁcant portion of the increase is due to the acceler-
ation of multifactor productivity (MFP) growth in this period. In the
United States, during the same period, acceleration in MFP growth is esti-
mated to be 0.6 percent, while that in Australia is 1 percent. The main ques-
tion posed is why there is such a diﬀerence in acceleration of MFP growth
rates.
The paper attributes this to a package of policy reforms in Australia.
These reforms are generally aimed at enhancing competition and the ﬂex-
ibility for ﬁrms to make adjustments. Although economic theory tells us
that they may indeed raise productivity, are we really sure that productiv-
ity acceleration in the sample period is driven by them? The paper attempts
to eliminate a number of alternative possibilities. The arguments given are
plausible, but they should not stop us from identifying other explanations.
First, if we look at the data cited seriously, the diﬀerence between the
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opment, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology.United States and Australia is not very big. A diﬀerence of 0.4 percentage
points per year amounts only to a total of about 2 percentage points dur-
ing the entire sample period. With such a small diﬀerence, are we begging
the question too much? Could this 2 percent be due to simple measurement
errors? We need data from a longer sample period to rule out this possi-
bility.
Second, the measurement of MFP growth in the United States may also
be biased. Even though education has been taken into account in arriving
at the MFP measures, it is unclear whether the quality aspect of education
has been fully considered. It is fairly well established that the quality of U.S.
schooling in the 1970s and 1980s, as measured by SAT scores and reading
and mathematics skills, was declining. This means that if only the quantity
side of education, such as the number of years of schooling, is taken into
account, the estimate for the MFP growth in the United States will be lower
than the true value.
Third, the reforms in Australia can introduce more competitive pressure
in the market. This could result in MFP growth eventually, but this may
take a long time to achieve. The reforms can also raise capacity utilization,
which may be confused with improvement in MFP growth.
Fourth, the speeds of technology spillovers and market penetration may
be diﬀerent in the United States and Australia. The fact that software
prices in Australia decline much faster than those in the United States in-
dicates this possibility, which, in fact, is not an uncommon phenomenon at
all. For example, as in Australia, the manufacturing sector of information
and communication technology (ICT) products in Hong Kong is small.
But the market penetration rate of mobile phones there is deeper than that
of the United States.
Fifth, much of the acceleration is driven by wholesale trade, cafes, and
restaurants. But these all exhibit negative growth in MFP in the previous
period. Is the growth acceleration due to the elimination of ineﬃciencies in
these sectors, or just recovery from business cycles? These sectors are all
consumption related. Is it possible that people have revised their antici-
pated permanent income because of greater optimism? In this scenario, the
MFP growth may not necessarily be related to the reforms.
Another contending hypothesis is that every factor contributes a little
bit to the overall change in the measured MFP. The possible strong linkage
between policy reforms and MFP growth may need a longer sample period
to establish. Alternatively, if there were more case studies of how these re-
forms have aﬀected various industries, then the conclusions in the paper
would be on ﬁrmer ground.
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